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Abstract
State-of-the-art machine learning models frequently misclassify inputs that have been
perturbed in an adversarial manner. Adversarial perturbations generated for a given
input and a specific classifier often seem to be effective on other inputs and even different
classifiers. In other words, adversarial perturbations seem to transfer between different
inputs, models, and even different neural network architectures. In this work, we show
that in the context of linear classifiers and two-layer ReLU networks, there provably exist
directions that give rise to adversarial perturbations for many classifiers and data points
simultaneously. We show that these “transferable adversarial directions” are guaranteed
to exist for linear separators of a given set, and will exist with high probability for linear
classifiers trained on independent sets drawn from the same distribution. We extend our
results to large classes of two-layer ReLU networks. We further show that adversarial
directions for ReLU networks transfer to linear classifiers while the reverse need not
hold, suggesting that adversarial perturbations for more complex models are more likely
to transfer to other classifiers. We validate our findings empirically, even for deeper
ReLU networks.
1 Introduction
Many popular machine learning models, including deep neural networks, have been shown to
be vulnerable to adversarial attacks (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Nguyen
et al., 2015; Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016). Small adversarial perturbations of image data
can cause the model to significantly misclassify the data, even though the perturbed image
may seem unchanged to the human eye. These perturbations are highly structured, as neural
networks have been shown to be robust to random perturbations (Liu et al., 2016; Fawzi et al.,
2016). While there has been a significant amount of work on designing adversarial attacks
(Grosse et al., 2016; Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016; Mopuri et al., 2017; Hendrik Metzen et al.,
2017; Papernot et al., 2016) and defenses against these attacks (Madry et al., 2017; Sinha
et al., 2017), theoretical properties of these adversarial perturbations are not fully understood.
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As shown by Athalye et al. (2018), state-of-the-art defenses are often beaten in short order
by newly designed attacks. A better theoretical understanding of these adversarial examples
could lead to a better understanding of why attack and defense strategies perform well in
certain situations and badly in others.
One phenomenon that has been repeatedly observed in the literature is that adversarial
perturbations often transfer to other data points. For instance, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017a)
show that adversarial perturbations for a given input often work as an adversarial direction
for many other inputs on the same neural networks. Such adversarial perturbations are often
referred to as “universal” adversarial perturbations. Even worse, adversarial perturbations
often transfer between classifiers (Papernot et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016). This seems to hold
even if the classifiers have different architectures and are trained on different subsets of the
training data (Szegedy et al., 2013).
This transferability has led to more effective adversarial attacks. Narodytska and Ka-
siviswanathan (2016) show that even if an adversary only has black-box access to a neural
network, they can still fool it relatively often. Papernot et al. (2016) construct adversarial
examples with only black-box access to a neural network by generating adversarial examples
on a substitute network designed to emulate the first. Recent work has attempted to make
machine learning systems more secure by “blocking” transferability (Hosseini et al., 2017), to
only limited success.
Unfortunately, adversarial perturbations are not yet fully understood, especially on a
theoretical level. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017b) show that adversarial perturbations exist if
certain geometric conditions hold, while Fawzi et al. (2018) study the robustness of linear
and quadratic classifiers to adversarial examples. Tramèr et al. (2017) show empirically that
subspaces corresponding to the span of adversarial examples often have large intersection,
demonstrating the capacity of adversarial examples to transfer. Still, it is not fully understood
why and which adversarial perturbations transfer between classifiers, even for relatively simple
classifiers.
Our Contributions: In this work, we show that for linear classifiers and certain two-layer
ReLU networks, classifiers trained on similar data sets can often be targeted by similar
adversarial perturbations. Moreover, the geometry of the decision boundary causes these
perturbations to be adversarial for most of the training data. We do this by analyzing
directions which lead to adversarial perturbations, so-called “adversarial directions.” While
many adversarial directions do not transfer to other classifiers and data, we explicitly construct
adversarial directions which will transfer with high probability.
In Section 3, we show that for linear classifiers, the max-margin SVM can be used to
construct adversarial directions which transfer to other data points and to other linear
classifiers. We also show that for all linear separators of a given dataset, there are universal
adversarial perturbations (that is, perturbations which are adversarial for all points with a
given label) whose norm depends only on the max-margin classifier. We extend our results
to soft-margin linear classifiers trained on independent data sets, as well as multi-class linear
classifiers. In Section 5, we consider adversarial perturbations for ReLU networks. We use a
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geometric analysis to show that there exist adversarial directions for certain two-layer ReLU
networks which transfer to all other such ReLU networks and all the training data of a given
class. In Section 6 we show that while these adversarial direction for ReLU networks transfer
to linear classifiers, the reverse need not hold. In Section 7, we augment our theory with an
empirical study showing that adversarial perturbations often transfer within a classifier, and
even between distinct classifiers.
2 Overview
Notation: In the following we denote vectors in bold script, and functions, sets, and scalars
in standard script. Matrices are denoted by capital letters. For a vector w, wi denotes its
ith element.
Suppose we have some data space X ⊆ Rd with label space Y. For any set S ⊆ X × Y
and a, b ∈ Y, let S[a] = {(x, y) ∈ S : y = a} and S[a, b] = {(x, y) ∈ S : y ∈ {a, b}}. A
classifier is a function h : X → Y . We say that h is S-accurate if for all (x, y) ∈ S, h(x) = y.
We are interested in when we can perturb x ∈ X to produce x′ such that h(x′) 6= h(x). This
leads to the following definition.
Definition. We say that v is an adversarial direction for h at (x, y) if h(x) = y and there
is some c > 0 such that h(x + cv) 6= y.
The vector cv is referred to as an adversarial perturbation, while the vector x′ = x+ cv is
referred to as an adversarial example. We will show that for well-known classes of classifiers,
there are directions that are adversarial for many classifiers on large subsets of X . In other
words, the adversarial direction is “transferable” both to other classifiers and to other data
points.
The fact that adversarial directions transfer is not immediately obvious or even true
for all models. For example, consider Figure 1. For any linear classifier, the most natural
adversarial direction is the normal vector to the decision boundary. If we consider just the
linear classifier h1, this direction is given by v1. However, v1 is not an adversarial direction
for h2, as moving in that direction does not change any labels. Similarly, v2 is adversarial
for h2 but not for h1. In short, not all adversarial directions transfer.
We instead show that the max-margin classifier for a set S gives us an adversarial direction
which transfers to all classifiers that linearly separate S, and extend this to the case where
we train two linear classifiers h1, h2 on S1, S2 sampled independently from some distribution
D. We derive the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose linear classifiers h1, h2 are trained on sets S(1), S(2) of size n sampled
independently from D, and that each hj correctly classifies Θ(n) of S(j) correctly. With high
probability, there is a vector w and a set S ⊆ S(1) ∪ S(2) such that w is an adversarial
direction for both h1 and h2, on S and |S ∩ S(j)| = Θ(n) for j = 1, 2.
This is an informal version of Theorem 7. Intuitively, as long as we train linear classifiers
on similar datasets, there is an adversarial direction which transfers between the linear
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Figure 1: The decision boundary of two linear classifiers, h1 (red) and h2 (blue). The data with
label +1 are marked by pluses, and those with label −1 are marked by circles. For the +1 data, v1
and v2 give adversarial directions for h1 and h2, respectively.
classifiers and works for most of the data. This occurs even if h1, h2 are not the max-margin
SVM on S(1), S(2). We derive a version of this for multi-class linear classifiers in Theorem 9.
For neural networks, the study of adversarial directions becomes more difficult. For a
linear classifier, an adversarial direction for some data point is also adversarial for other
data points with the same label. This need not hold for neural networks. Consider Figure 2.
There are two nonlinear decision boundaries for classifiers h1, h2. Note that v1 is adversarial
for h1 at x1 and for the other points with +1 label. However, v1 does not transfer to the
+1 instances for h2. Furthermore, v2 is an adversarial direction for h2 at x2, but does not
transfer to all other points with label −1 for h2, nor does it transfer to any −1 labeled point
for h1.
Figure 2: Two nonlinear decision boundaries, h1 (red) and h2 (blue). The instances with label +1
are marked by pluses, those with label −1 are marked by circles. An adversarial direction for h1 at
x1 is denoted by v1, while an adversarial direction for h2 at x2 is denoted by v2.
With arbitrarily complicated decision boundaries, the study of adversarial directions
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becomes difficult. If we impose structure on our neural networks, we can begin to understand
them. We show that for large classes of two-layer ReLU networks, there are transferable
adversarial directions. The following theorem is an informal version of Theorem 15.
Theorem 2. Fix a set S and consider the set of two-layer ReLU network with nonnegative
weights on the final layer that correctly classify S. There is a vector vS that is adversarial
for all such networks at any point (x, y) ∈ S such that y = −1.
We also study whether adversarial directions transfer between linear classifiers and ReLUs.
In Section 6 we show that while the adversarial direction for ReLU networks in Theorem 2
transfers to linear classifiers, the adversarial direction for linear classifiers in Theorem 1 does
not necessarily transfer to ReLUs. In general, it seems that adversarial directions are more
likely to transfer to a classifier with a less complicated decision boundary than with a more
complicated one. We give supporting empirical evidence for this phenomenon in Section 7.
3 Linear Classifiers
3.1 Hard-margin Classifiers
We first focus on the case of hard-margin linear classifiers trained on the same training
set S. By hard-margin, we mean that the classifier should correctly classify every point in
S. We will show that the max-margin SVM classifier on S gives a transferable adversarial
perturbation between the linear classifiers. We will relate the size of the perturbation needed
to the support vector coefficients. We will use this as a stepping stone to consider both
soft-margin linear classifiers and training data sampled from some underlying distribution.
Suppose we have data X ⊆ Rd with labels {±1}. An linear classifier h is given by
h(x) = sign(〈w,x〉+ b) for some w ∈ Rd, b ∈ R. Note that h(x) is invariant under scaling
(w, b) by the same positive constant, so we restrict to ‖w‖2 = 1. We let H denote the set of
such linear classifiers.
Suppose we have some set S of labeled examples {(x, y)}Ni=1 and that h is S-accurate.
We will let HS := {h ∈ H | h is S-accurate}. The margin of h ∈ HS is defined as
γ(h) = min(x,y)∈S y(〈w,x〉+ b).
We say that S is linearly separable if HS 6= ∅. In this case, standard theory shows that
there is an SVM classifier h∗ ∈ HS with maximum margin given by h∗ = sign(〈w∗,x〉+ b∗).
We will let γ∗ denote its margin. We will use the following lemma about max-margin
classifiers on S. This follows from Theorem 15.8 of Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014)
and the discussion thereafter, combined with strong duality.
Lemma 3. There are αi ≥ 0 such that (1) w∗ =
∑N
i=1 αiyixi and (2)
∑N
i=1 αiyi = 0.
We will use this to show that the max-margin classifier gives us a transferable adversarial
direction.
Theorem 4. For all h ∈ HS and (x, y) ∈ S, −yw∗ is an adversarial direction for h at x.
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A slight modification of the proof shows the following.
Theorem 5. Fix h ∈ HS with margin γh. Fix (x, y) such that y(〈w,x〉 + b) > 0. Then
h(x− cyw∗) 6= h(x) for all c satisfying
c >
y(〈w,x〉+ b)
γh
∑N
i=1 αi
.
Fix a linear classifier h. If we take (x, y) to be the point in S with minimum margin for
h, this implies that as long as c > (
∑N
i=1 αi)
−1, we will have h(x− cyw∗) 6= h(x). Thus, for
this c, we are guaranteed that perturbing the data by cyw∗ will cause h to misclassify some
x. This implies the following corollary.
Corollary 6. For any h ∈ HS, there is some (x, y) ∈ S such that for all c > (
∑N
i=1 αi)
−1,
h(x− cyw∗) 6= h(x).
Thus, for any set S, there is a universal constant cS such that for any h that linearly
separates S and any (x, y) ∈ S, −cSyw∗ is an adversarial perturbation for h at x.
3.2 Soft-margin Classifiers
The results above have two fundamental limitations. First, they only concern hard-margin
linear classifiers. Second, they assume that the classifiers are trained on the same dataset S.
Here, we extend the results above to soft-margin linear classifiers trained on samples drawn
independently from some distribution. We will show that if we train two separate soft-margin
linear classifiers on independently drawn training sets, then with high probability, there will
be a single adversarial direction for both classifiers that affects most of the training examples
in both sets.
Let D be a distribution over X × Y ⊆ Rd × {±1}. We assume that with probability
1 over D, ‖x‖2 ≤ R. Let S(1), S(2) be training sets of size n drawn independently from
D. Suppose we have two linear classifiers w(1),w(2) trained on S(1) and S(2) in some way.
For notational simplicity, we assume no bias terms, though the same result can be derived
in this setting. Thus, the label assigned to x ∈ X by w(j) is hj(x) = sign(〈w(j),x〉). We
make no assumptions about the training process itself. We only make three relatively minor
assumptions on the output of the training process.
Assumption A1. With probability 1 over the training procedure, ‖w(j)‖2 ≤ B.
Assumption A2. The probability that w(1) correctly classifies any point in S(1) is indepen-
dent from the probability w(2) correctly classifies any point in S(2), and vice-versa.
Assumption A3. There are at least (1 − ρ)n for ρ ∈ [0, 1) points (x, y) ∈ S(j) such that
y〈w(j),x〉 ≥ 1.
A1 is a straightforward assumption that states that the output of the training method
cannot be of unbounded size, while A2 essentially states that the training procedures are
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independent. A3 simply says that hj is correct and confident about its prediction on at least
a (1− ρ) fraction of the dataset. Under these assumptions, we have the following theorem
about adversarial directions for h1 and h2.
Theorem 7. Under the assumptions above, with probability at least 1− 4n−2, there is a set
S ⊆ S(1) ∪ S(2) with max-margin SVM w∗S such that for j ∈ {1, 2},
1. |S ∩ S(j)| ≥ (1− 2ρ)n− 2BR√n− 4√n ln(n).
2. For all (x, y) ∈ S, −yw∗S is an adversarial direction for hj at x.
Note that for ρ < 12 and BR = o(
√
n), |S ∩ S(j)| = Θ(n). Thus, there is a large subset
of S(1) ∪ S(2) that both h1 and h2 are accurate on, but for which there is an adversarial
direction v that transfers among all points in S and both classifiers.
To prove this, we first use Rademacher complexity bounds to show there is a large subset
S ⊆ S(1) ∪ S(2) that both h1 and h2 classify correctly. Once we know that such an S exists,
we can use our hard-margin results to find an adversarial direction v that is adversarial for
both classifiers on most of the union of the training sets. The details are in Appendix A.3.
4 Multi-class Linear Classifiers
4.1 Hard-margin Classifiers
Suppose now that we have data X ⊆ Rd with K potential labels. We will assume these labels
are {1, 2, . . . ,K}. We now consider multi-class classification. One standard way to extend
linear classifiers to multi-class classification is to use a one-versus-rest approach. With this
approach, we train K binary linear classifiers. We train the k-th linear classifier on a version
of S with modified labels, where labels of k are replaced with +1 and the remaining labels
are replaced with −1. To classify x, we evaluate it on all K linear classifiers and return the
class maximizing its output value.
Formally, we consider classifiers of the form h(x) = g(Wx+b) where W ∈ RK×d, b ∈ RK
and g(z) = argmax1≤i≤K zi. Intuitively, g(z) returns the index i of the largest entry of z.
We letM denote the set of such classifiers.
This setup generalizes standard techniques such soft-max layers. The soft-max function
s : Rd → Rd turns any vector in to a probability vector, but satisfies g(s(z)) = g(z).
Therefore, our setup includes the soft-max function and any classifier h that returns the
index maximizing the vector Wx + b. Let S denote some set of instances with labels in
{1, . . . ,K}. We will letMS denote the set of S-accurate classifiers.
Note. A linear classifier is S-accurate if 〈w,x〉+ b is positive for all positive instances and
negative for the rest. For the multi-class case, S-accuracy does not require positivity of any
classifier. Suppose x has label k, and let z = Wx + b. To classify x accurately we do not
require zj < 0 for j 6= k. In fact, all of z can be positive as long as the largest entry is zk.
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Recall that for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we define S[k] = {(x, y) ∈ S | y = k}. We will use
max-margin classifiers to construct transferable adversarial directions for S[k], as in the
following theorem.
Theorem 8. Fix k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. There is a vector v∗k such that for all h ∈MS and for all
(x, y) ∈ S[k], v∗k is an adversarial direction for h at x.
A proof is given in the appendix. In fact, the theorem actually shows a slightly stronger
statement. Namely, that for distinct k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, there is a vector v∗k,l that is an
adversarial direction for all h ∈MS and for all (x, y) ∈ S[k, l], where S[k, l] was defined as
{(x, y) ∈ S | y ∈ {k, l}}.
Note that it is not necessarily true that for sufficiently large c, for any x ∈ S[k],
h(x− cw∗) = m. The direction −w∗ may also increase the output associated to some other
label. Since we know that (W (x− cw∗) + b)k < (W (x− cw∗) + b)l for sufficiently large c,
this is sufficient to show that h(x− cw∗) 6= k = h(x).
4.2 Soft-margin Classifiers
As in Section 3, we can extend our results to soft-margin classifiers trained on independently
drawn sets. Suppose that we have some distribution D on X × {1, . . . ,K} such that with
probability 1 over D, ‖x‖2 ≤ R. Let S(1), S(2) be training sets drawn independently from D.
We have two models W (1),W (2) trained on S(1) and S(2) in some way again with no bias
terms. Let w(j)i denote the transpose of the i-th row of W
(j). The label assigned to x ∈ X
by W (j) is given by hj(x) = max1≤i≤K〈w(j)i ,x〉.
As in Section 3, we do not make any explicit assumptions on the training process, only a
few minor assumptions on the output models. Fix some k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Recall that for any
set S ⊆ Rd × {1, . . . ,K}, S[k] denotes the subset of S with label k and S[k, l] denotes the
subset with label k or l. We assume the following three properties hold for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Assumption B1. With probability 1 over the training procedure, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
‖w(j)i ‖2 ≤ B.
Assumption B2. The probability that W (1) correctly classifies any point in S(1) is indepen-
dent from S(2) and W (2), and vice-versa.
Assumption B3. There is a label l such that at least a (1− ρ) fraction of points (x, y) ∈
S(j)[k, l] satisfy hj(x) = y and |〈w(j)k ,x〉 − 〈w(j)l ,x〉| > 1.
B1 and B2 are analogues of A1 and A2 in the linear classifier case and are relatively
straightforward assumptions. B3 is a kind of multi-class generalization of A3. It says
that our classifier is approximately accurate on a fraction of samples with label k or l, and
moreover, that for such samples, W (j) is much more confident about the label k than the
label l. In other words, W (j) does not conflate the labels k and l.
For simplicity we assume that |S(1)[k, l]| = |S(2)[k, l]| = n. In general, we can derive an
analogous result to Theorem 9 below based on the ratio of |S(1)[k, l]| to |S(2)[k, l]|. Note that
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as we sample more from D, with high probability |S(1)[k, l]|/|S(2)[k, l]| will be close to 1. We
then have the following theorem, whose proof we leave to the appendix.
Theorem 9. Fix k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} satisfying the above assumptions. With probability at least
1− 4n−2, there is a vector v and a set S ⊆ S(1)[k, l] ∪ S(2)[k, l] such that for j ∈ {1, 2},
1. |S ∩ S(j)[k, l]| ≥ (1− 2ρ)n− 4BR√n− 4√n ln(n).
2. For all (x, y) ∈ S such that hj(x) = y, −v is an adversarial direction for hj if y = k,
and v is an adversarial direction for hj if y = l.
Note. Condition 2 of Theorem 9 is slightly weaker than condition 2 of Theorem 7. While
the adversarial direction still transfers, we do not require h1 to correctly classify S ∩ S(2)[k, l].
This slight weakening comes about by reducing the multi-class linear classification case to the
single-class linear classification case.
5 Two-layer ReLU Networks
In this section we show that for certain classes of two-layer ReLU networks and any data set
S, there is an adversarial direction for all networks in this class that separate S. In other
words, if we restrict to certain classes of two-layer ReLU networks, then fitting to a data set
S forces the network to be susceptible in specific directions.
Let σ denote the ReLU function. For z ∈ R, σ(z) = max{0, z}. For z ∈ Rn, we abuse
notation to let σ(z) denote the vector with σ(z)i = σ(zi). A two-layer ReLU network with
hidden layer of width L is a function f : Rd → Rk of the form f(x) = V σ(Wx + b).
For simplicity, we will only consider binary classification with labels {±1}. Therefore,
we restrict to the setting where k = 1, so that there is only one output unit. In this case,
a ReLU network is of the form f(x) = vTσ(Wx + b) for some v ∈ RL. A ReLU classifier
is a function h : Rd → {±1} of the form h(x) = g(f(x)) where f is a ReLU network and
g : R→ {±1} is some decision rule. We will often consider g that are indicator functions of
the form g(z) = 1 for z ∈ A and −1 otherwise. We denote such a function by JA(z).
We first consider ReLU networks F where v is the all-ones vector and ReLU classifiers
R consisting of ReLU networks in F combined with the classification rule g where g(x) = 1
if x > 0 and −1 otherwise. Formally, we define:
F :=
{
f : Rd → R
∣∣∣∣∣ f(x) =
L∑
i=1
σ(wTi x + bi)
}
.
R :=
{
h : Rd → {±1}
∣∣∣∣ h(x) = g(f(x)),g(z) = J(0,∞)(z)
}
.
Intuitively, such ReLU classifiers compute L functions of the form σ(wTi x + bi) and then
return 1 if at least one of these is positive.
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Let S ⊆ Rd × {±1} denote a set of labeled data. We assume that S contains at least one
example with each label. We let RS denote the set of S-accurate classifiers in R. We then
have the following theorem that shows the existence of transferable adversarial directions for
such classifiers.
Theorem 10. There is some v such that for all h ∈ RS and (x,−1) such that h(x) = −1,
v is an adversarial direction for h at x.
Note that the theorem implies more than v being adversarial for h on S. In particular, it
applies to any (x,−1) such that h(x) = −1. Thus, v may be adversarial for more than just
instances in the training set.
We will derive this theorem as a consequence of a more general theorem. Suppose we
have two possible labels, α and β. Consider all functions h : Rd → {α, β}. Suppose we have
some set S ⊆ Rd × {α, β}. We will analyze h such that h−1(α) is convex (note that h−1(β)
is not necessarily convex). We define
C := {h | h is continuous, h−1(α) is convex}.
We denote the set of S-accurate h in C by CS . We then have the following theorem, which
we prove in the appendix.
Theorem 11. There is some v such that for all h ∈ CS and (x, α) such that h(x) = α, v is
an adversarial direction for h at x.
The requirement that h ∈ CS can be weakened. Fix xα ∈ S[α] and xβ ∈ S[β]. Let T
denote the set of continuous functions h : Rd → {α, β} such that h(xα) = α, h(xβ) = β, and
there is some convex set Ch containing xα such that for all x ∈ Cch, h(x) = β. A similar
proof then shows the following result.
Theorem 12. Fix xα ∈ S[α],xβ ∈ S[β]. There is some v ∈ Rd such that for all h ∈ T and
for all (x, α) ∈ Ch such that h(x) = α, v is an adversarial direction for h at x.
To apply Theorem 11 to RS , it suffices to show the following lemma. We do so in the
appendix.
Lemma 13. For h ∈ R, h−1(−1) is convex.
We can extend R to include a broader class of ReLU classifiers. Define
F ′ :=
{
f : Rd → R
∣∣∣∣ f(x) = vTσ(Wx + b),vi ≥ 0, ∀i
}
.
G :=
{
g : R→ {±1}
∣∣∣∣ g(z) = J(a,∞)(z), a > 0or g(z) = J[a,∞)(z), a > 0
}
.
We can view F ′ as the set of two-layer ReLU neural networks whose output layer has all
nonnegative weights. We then define
R′ :=
{
h : Rd → {±1}
∣∣∣∣ h(x) = g(f(x)),f ∈ F ′, g ∈ G
}
.
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In order to apply Theorem 11, we would need to show that one of the decision regions of
any h ∈ R′ is convex. More formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 14. For h ∈ R′, h−1(−1) is convex.
A proof is given in the appendix. Combining Theorem 11 and Lemma 14, we derive the
following.
Theorem 15. There is some v such that for all h ∈ R′S and (x,−1) such that h(x) = −1,
v is an adversarial direction for h at x.
We can also extend this result to a class of ReLU classifiers R′′ that are similar to R.
Here, we consider the set of ReLU networks
F ′′ :=
{
f : Rd → RL
∣∣∣ f(x) = σ(Wx + b)}
where W ∈ RL×d so that the output is potentially vector-valued and σ is the ReLU function
applied entry-wise. Let φ : RL → R where φ(z) = 1 if all entries of z are positive and −1
otherwise. We then define
R′′ :=
{
h : Rd → {±1}
∣∣∣∣ h(x) = φ(f(x)),f ∈ F ′′
}
Since φ(z) = 1 if all the entries of x are positive and −1 otherwise, h−1(1) is the intersection
of L open half-spaces corresponding to the pair (W, b). Therefore, h−1(1) is convex. Applying
Theorem 11, we then get the following theorem concerning the set R′′S of S-accurate classifiers
in R′′.
Theorem 16. There is some v such that for all h ∈ R′′S and (x, 1) such that h(x) = 1, v is
an adversarial direction for h at x.
6 Transferability Between Linear Classifiers and ReLU Net-
works
In this section we analyze whether the adversarial directions above transfer between classifiers
of different types. We will determine if and when adversarial directions for linear classifiers
in Section 3 transfer to the ReLU classifiers in Section 5 and vice-versa.
Suppose we have some training set S ⊆ Rd × {±1}. We wish to consider applying both
linear classifiers and ReLU classifiers to S. Recall that above, we defined H to be the set
of linear classifiers on Rd. We also defined R′ as the set of two-layer ReLU classifiers of
the form h(x) = g(f(x)) where g(z) = J[a,∞)(z) or g(z) = J(a,∞)(z) and f is of the form
f(x) = vTσ(Wx + b) with v ≥ 0. Recall that for a set A, JA(z) is 1 if z ∈ A and −1
otherwise.
We will let HS ,R′S denote the set of S-accurate classifiers in each of these sets. In Section
3, we constructed adversarial directions that applied to all h ∈ HS and all (x, y) ∈ S, while
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in Section 5, we constructed adversarial directions for all h ∈ R′S and (x, y) ∈ S[−1], that is,
examples with label −1. We will show that the adversarial direction for R′S constructed in
Theorem 15 transfers to HS , while the adversarial direction for HS constructed in Theorem
4 need not transfer to R′S .
To see that the adversarial direction v for R′S transfers to HS , recall that this direction
was derived from Theorem 11. In particular, all that is necessary for v to transfer to a
classifier h is that h−1(−1) is convex and that HS is non-empty. Since linear classifiers divide
the data space in to half-spaces, we know that for any h ∈ H, h−1(−1) and h−1(+1) are
both convex. Therefore, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 17. Suppose S is linearly separable. Then there exists v ∈ Rd such that for all
h ∈ R′S ∪HS and x ∈ h−1(−1), v is an adversarial direction for h at x.
The adversarial direction for HS constructed in Theorem 4 does not necessarily transfer
to R′S . A graphical explanation of this is given in Figure 3. As stated in Corollary 17, the
ReLU adversarial direction v2 constructed in the proof of Theorem 15 transfers to the linear
classifier classifier h1. However, the linear classifier adversarial direction v1 constructed in
the proof of Theorem 4 does not serve as an adversarial direction for the −1 labeled points
for h2. The vector v2 is constructed in the proof of Theorem 11 in Appendix A.6, and can
be any vector v2 in the direction of xβ − xα for any xβ ∈ S[1],xα ∈ S[−1].
Figure 3: The decision boundary of a linear classifier h1 and a two-layer ReLU classifier h2, in red
and blue, respectively. The instances with label 1 are marked by pluses, those with label −1 are
marked by circles. The vector v1 is the adversarial direction for h1 from Theorem 4, and v2 is the
ReLU adversarial direction Theorem 15 pointing from xα to xβ .
This intuitive idea formalized in Appendix A.9. There, we explicitly construct a linearly
separable dataset and a ReLU network that correctly classifies the data but where the
max-margin classifier does not transfer to the ReLU classifier.
7 Experiments
In this section we empirically study how well adversarial perturbations transfer between classi-
fiers. As demonstrated by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017a), Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan
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(2016), and Papernot et al. (2016), adversarial examples often transfer to other classifiers.
Here, we show empirically that adversarial perturbations for ReLU networks often transfer
to other ReLU networks and SVMs. Similarly, adversarial perturbations for SVMs trained
on different data sets often transfer among one another. Our experiments indicate that
adversarial examples generated from SVMs transfer less often to ReLU networks.
Setup: We use the MNIST dataset to perform our experiments. MNIST consists of
handwritten numbers represented as vectors x ∈ R28×28 with labels in {0, 1, . . . , 9}. We use
Pytorch (Paszke et al., 2017) to train 50 moderately-sized neural networks with the same
architecture as the PyTorch MNIST examples. Each neural network is trained on 10000
random images from the MNIST training set. We use scikit-Learn LinearSVC (Pedregosa
et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2008) to train 50 support vector machines, each on 10000 random
images from the MNIST training set.
To generate adversarial examples, we iterate the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
of Goodfellow et al. (2014). Define B(x, ) = {x′ : ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ }. To find an adversarial
x′ ∈ B(x, ), we use projected gradient ascent with step-size γ to maximize the loss function
J . Thus, we move our iterates x(t) in the direction of γ∇x(t)(J) and then project on to
B(x, ).
We perform 40 iterations with γ = .01 to produce adversarial examples in B(x, ) for  in
{0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.40}. For each classifier and , we construct 1000 adversarial examples by
applying FGSM to 1000 randomly selected examples from the MNIST test set. For each ,
this gives us 50000 SVM adversarial examples 50000 neural network adversarial examples.
We also generate 50000 random perturbations for a given .
For each classifier, we find its overall accuracy on the random perturbations, SVM
adversarial examples, and neural network adversarial examples. We plot the average accuracy
(over all classifiers of a given type) in Figure 4. We also plot error bars corresponding to the
minimum and maximum total accuracy of any single classifier on each type of adversarial
examples.
As previously demonstrated in other works (see work by Liu et al. (2016) and Fawzi
et al. (2016)), both SVMs and neural networks are relatively robust to random perturbations.
Consider Figure 4a. This shows that SVMs are often susceptible to adversarial examples
generated from other SVMs trained on different subsets of the data. This supports our
result that SVMs trained independently from some distribution are jointly susceptible to
some adversarial direction. Moreover, SVMs are still somewhat susceptible to adversarial
examples generated from neural networks. While SVM adversaries are more effective than
NN adversaries at fooling other SVMs, the neural network adversarial examples still do much
better than random perturbations.
Similarly, neural network adversarial examples transfer to other neural networks, as
shown in Figure 4b. Despite being trained on different subsets of the data, these neural
networks are often susceptible to similar perturbations. This stands in stark contrast to the
resilience of neural networks to random perturbations. This figure also supports our theory
from Section 6 stating that adversarial examples generated from SVMs need not transfer
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Figure 4: Average classifier accuracy after applying perturbations of varying `∞ norm.
Perturbations are generated randomly, by SVM adversaries, and by neural network (NN)
adversaries.
to neural networks. SVM adversaries only do slightly better than random perturbations
at fooling neural networks. This aligns with the empirically observed phenomenon that
classifiers with more capacity seem to be more resistant to adversarial attacks (Goodfellow
et al., 2014).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we theoretically investigate the transferability of adversarial directions on linear
classifiers and two-layer ReLU networks. Our results show that classifiers that accurately
classify similar datasets are often jointly susceptible to some adversarial direction. This
holds even without assumptions on the training procedure. Moreover, we show that while
adversarial perturbations for ReLU networks transfer to linear classifiers, the reverse need
not hold. We confirm all of our findings experimentally on MNIST.
Adversarial examples and transferability are still not fully understood. While we focus on
adversarial directions, a natural extension would be to constrain the norm of the perturbation
allowed. Second, our results are derived only for linear classifiers, and could be studied from
a kernel perspective as well. Finally, our results above show that ReLU adversarial examples
often transfer to linear classifiers. Is this phenomenon more general? Do adversarial examples
classifiers with higher effective capacity tend to transfer to those with lower effective capacity?
Answers to these questions could help inform future work in designing adversary-resistant
classifiers.
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A Proof of Results
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Fix h ∈ HS where h(x) = sign(〈w,x〉+ b). Pick (x, y) ∈ S, and suppose h(x) = y.
We wish to show that for some c > 0, h(x − cyw∗) = −y. By Lemma 3, we know
w∗ =
∑N
i=1 αiyixi such that
∑N
i=1 αiyi = 0. Therefore,
〈w,w∗〉 = 〈w,
N∑
i=1
αiyixi〉 =
N∑
i=1
αiyi〈w,xi〉. (A.1)
We know that h ∈ HS , so yi(〈w,xi〉+ b) > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Therefore, yi〈w,xi〉 > −yib.
Plugging this in to (A.1) we get
〈w,w∗〉 =
N∑
i=1
αiyi〈w,xi〉 >
N∑
i=1
αi(−yib) = 0 (A.2)
Here we used the fact that αi ≥ 0 and
∑N
i=1 αiyi = 0. This then implies
〈w,x− cyw∗〉+ b = (〈w,x〉+ b)− cy〈w,w∗〉. (A.3)
Since sign(〈w,x〉+ b) = y and 〈w,w∗〉 > 0, we know that sign(y〈w,w∗〉) 6= sign(〈w,x〉+ b).
Therefore, by taking c large enough we will have sign(〈w,x− cyw∗〉+ b) = −y.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. The proof is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 4, except we use the fact that
for any i, y(〈w,xi〉+ b) ≥ γh. Then (A.2) can be refined to
〈w,w∗〉
=
N∑
i=1
αiyi〈w,xi〉 ≥
N∑
i=1
αi(γh − yib) = γh
N∑
i=1
αi.
(A.4)
For c >
y(〈w,x〉+ b)
γh
∑N
i=1 αi
we have
y(〈w, x− cyw∗〉+ b)
= y(〈w,x〉+ b)− c〈w∗,w〉
< y(〈w,x〉+ b)− y(〈w,x〉+ b)
γh
∑N
i=1 αi
γh
N∑
i=1
αi
= 0.
Therefore, h(x− cyw∗) 6= h(x).
17
A.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Recall that we assume that with probability 1 over D, ‖x‖2 ≤ R. Define
H := {w ∈ Rd | ‖w‖2 ≤ B}
and let ` : H×X × Y → R be a loss function of the form
`(w, (x, y)) = φ(〈w,x〉, y). (A.5)
Suppose that for all y, φ(·, y) is L-Lipschitz and |φ(a, y)| ≤ c for all a ∈ [−BR,BR]. Then
Theorem 26.12 of Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014) states that for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with
probability at least 1− δ over an i.i.d. sample of size n drawn from D,
∀w ∈ H, LD(w) ≤ LS(w) + 2ρBR√
n
+ c
√
2 ln(2/δ)
n
where
LD(w) := E(x,y)∼D[`(w, (x, y))]
LS(w) :=
1
n
∑
(x,y)∈S
`(w, (x, y)).
We will apply this to the ramp loss (Huang et al., 2014). The ramp function ψ : R→ R is
defined by
ψ(u) :=
{
max{0, 1− u}, u ≥ 0
1, u < 0
.
The loss function is then given by
`(w, (x, y)) = ψ(y〈w,x〉).
In other words, the ramp loss agrees with the hinge loss for y〈w,x〉 ≥ 0 and is otherwise 1.
In particular, ` is of the form in (A.5), is 1-Lipschitz, and is bounded by 1. Moreover, it is
simple to see that it gives an upper bound for the 0-1 loss
`0−1(w, (x, y)) = I(0,∞)(y〈w,x〉).
Therefore, with probability at least 1− δ over S, we have
∀w ∈ H, P(x,y)∼D[y〈w,x〉 > 0] ≤ LD(w)
≤ LS(w) + 2BR√
n
+
√
2 ln(2/δ)
n
.
Let S(j),w(j) for j ∈ {1, 2} be as above. Note that by A1, w(j) ∈ H. Moreover, by A3,
`(w(j), (x, y)) = 0 for at least (1−ρ)n samples in S(j). Since |`(w, (x, y))| ≤ 1, the remaining
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samples contribute at most ρ to LS(j)(w
(j)). Therefore, with probability at least 1− 2δ over
S(1) and S(2), we have that for j ∈ {1, 2},
P(x,y)∼D[hj(x) 6= y] ≤ ρ+
2BR√
n
+
√
2 ln(2/δ)
n
. (A.6)
Assume that this holds. By A2, we know that for each (x, y) ∈ S(2), the probability that h1
misclassifies this point is bounded above by (A.6). Let Xi denote the event that h1 correctly
classifies the i-th sample of S(2). Thus,
E
[
n∑
i=1
Xi
]
≥ (1− ρ)n− 2BR√n−
√
2 ln(2/δ)n.
Let S(2)1 ⊆ S(2) denote the set of points h1 correctly classifies. By Hoeffding’s inequality, we
find that with probability at least 1− n−2,
|S(2)1 | =
n∑
i=1
Xi
≥ (1− ρ)n− 2BR√n−
√
2 ln(2/δ)n−
√
n ln(n).
Taking δ = n−2, we know that with probability at least 1− n−2,
|S(2)1 | ≥ (1− ρ)n− 2BR
√
n− 4
√
n ln(n).
Let S(2)12 ⊆ S(2)1 ⊆ S(2) be the subset of points that h1 and h2 correctly classify. Since h2
misclassifies at most ρn points from S(2), we know that with probability at least 1− n−2,
|S(2)12 | ≥ (1− 2ρ)n− 2BR
√
n− 4
√
n ln(n). (A.7)
By the same argument, with probability at least 1 − n−2, the set S(1)12 ⊆ S(1) of points
correctly classified by h1 and h2 satisfies
|S(1)12 | ≥ (1− 2ρ)n− 2BR
√
n− 4
√
n ln(n). (A.8)
Let S = S(1)12 ∪ S(2)12 . Taking a union bound with (A.6), (A.7), and (A.8) with the value
δ = n−2, we find that condition 1 in Theorem 7 holds and that both hj are S-accurate. We
now need to construct an adversarial example. By construction, however, h1, h2 both linearly
separate S. Let HS denote the set of linear classifiers that linearly separate S. Then by
Theorem 4, the max-margin classifier v with respect to S gives an adversarial direction for
all h ∈ HS and (x, y) ∈ S, proving condition 2.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. We will proceed by reducing to the case of single-class linear classification. Initially,
one may think that we can simply consider the kth linear classifier of h. However, as noted
above, S-accuracy is a weak enough condition that there may be (x, y) ∈ S such that y 6= k
but (Wx+b)k > 0. In other words, S-accuracy does not require each of the k linear classifiers
to be accurate with respect to one-versus-rest classification.
Instead, select some l 6= k. Then for all (x, k) ∈ S[k], we know that (Wx+b)k > (Wx+b)l,
while for all (x, l) ∈ S[l], the reverse holds. Define w := wk −wl and a := bk − bl. Then
for all (x, k) ∈ S[k], 〈w,x〉+ a > 0 while for all (x, l) ∈ S[l], 〈w,x〉+ a < 0. Therefore, the
linear classifier h associated to (w, a) is S[k]∪S[l] accurate. Hence, there is some max-margin
classifier h∗ on this instance set with associated tuple (w∗, a∗). In particular, by Theorem 4
we know that v = −w∗ is an adversarial direction for h at all (x, y) ∈ S[k].
A.5 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. We will apply similar techniques to the proof of Theorem 8 in order to reduce this
to a situation similar to that of Theorem 7. Select l as in B3 and fix j ∈ {1, 2}. Define
w(j) := w
(j)
k −w(j)l . Let T (j) denote the set S(j)[k] ∪ S(j)[l], but with the label k replaced
by 1 and the label l replaced by −1.
By the triangle inequality and B1, we know that ‖w(j)‖2 ≤ 2B, and that B2 implies
that whether w(1) correctly classifies some point in T (1) is independent from (T (2),w(2)) and
vice-versa. By B3, we know that there are at least (1− ρ)nj,k points (x, 1) ∈ T (j)[k] such
that 〈w(j),x〉 > 1.
Let D[k, l] be the marginal distribution of D on X × {k, l}, and let D′ denote the
corresponding distribution on X × {±1} given by replacing k by 1 and l by −1. Note that
T (1) and T (2) are both sets of size n drawn i.i.d. from the distribution D′.
We can then apply Theorem 7 to T (1) and T (2). This implies that there is a set
T ⊆ T (1) ∪ T (2) and a perturbation v such that |T ∩ T (j)| ≥ (1− 2ρ)n− 4BR− 4√n ln(n)
and for all (x, y) ∈ T , −yv is an adversarial direction for w(j) at x. Note that we obtain a
4BR term instead of a 2BR term due to the fact that ‖w(j)‖2 ≤ 2B instead of B.
We define S to be T but replacing the labels 1,−1 with k, l. Therefore, S satisfies
condition 1 of the theorem. It now suffices to show condition 2. Suppose (x, y) ∈ S ∩ S(j)[k]
and hj(x) = k. Then 〈w(j),x〉 > 0. By construction of v, −v is an adversarial direction for
w(j), so there is some c such that 〈w(j),x− cv〉 < 0. This implies that (W (j)x)l > (W (j)x)k,
so hj(x) 6= k. We can argue analogously for (x, y) ∈ S ∩ S(j)[l], completing the proof.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 11
Proof. Fix h ∈ CS and let A = h−1(α). Then A is a closed convex set. Therefore, A is the
intersection of affine hyperplanes. That is, there is some collection of hyperplanes indexed by
a set I where
A =
⋂
i∈I
{
x ∈ Rd
∣∣∣ wTi x + bi ≤ 0} .
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Select some xα ∈ S[α] and xβ ∈ S[β], and let v = xβ − xα. Note that we then have for all
i ∈ I,
wTi v = w
T
i xβ −wTi xα ≥ bi − bi = 0.
Note however that since xα,xβ are assigned different labels by h (as h is S-accurate), it
cannot be the case that wTi xα + bi = 0 = w
T
i xβ + bi. Therefore, w
T
i v > 0. Hence, for any
x ∈ h−1(α), there is some c > 0 such that for all i ∈ I,
wTi (x + cv) + bi = w
T
i x + bi + cw
T
i v > 0.
In particular, this implies that x + cv /∈ A, and so h(x + cv) 6= h(x). Since the choice of v
was independent of h, we find that v is adversarial for all h ∈ CS .
A.7 Proof of Lemma 13
Proof. By definition of R, we can write h(x) = g(f(x)) where f(x) = ∑Li=1wTi x + bi and
g(z) = J(0,∞)(z). Therefore, h(x) = 1 iff wTi x+ bi > 0 for some i. In particular, this implies
h−1(−1) =
L⋂
i=1
{
x ∈ Rd
∣∣∣ wTi x + bi ≤ 0} .
This is a convex region.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 14
Proof. Suppose h(x) = g(f(x)) where f(x) = vTσ(Wx + b), v ≥ 0, and g(z) = J[a,∞)(z).
The case where g(z) = J(a,∞)(z) follows from a virtually identical argument. Let wTi denote
the ith row of W . Let A = h−1(1). We also define a set B as follows:
B :=
⋃
I∈P([L])
I 6=∅
BI .
BI :=
{
x ∈ Rd
∣∣∣∣∣
〈∑
i∈I
viwi, x
〉
+
∑
i∈I
vibi ≥ a
}
.
Here, P([L]) denotes the power set of {1, . . . , L}. Note that B is a union of closed
half-spaces, so its complement Bc is convex. We wish to show that A = B. This then implies
that h−1(−1) = Ac = Bc is convex. For a given i ∈ [L], we will let fi(x) = viσ(wTi x + bi).
Then note that f(x) =
∑L
i=1 fi(x) and each fi is nonnegative (as vi ≥ 0 for all i). Let
fI(x) =
∑
i∈I fi(x). Therefore, for any I ∈ P([L]), we have
f(x) = fI(x) + fIc(x).
21
Since fIc(x) ≥ 0, we know that f(x) ≥ fI(x) for all I. Let qi(x) = viwTi x + vibi and
qI(x) =
∑
i∈I qi(x). Then clearly qi(x) ≤ fi(x) and
BI =
{
x ∈ Rd
∣∣∣ qI(x) ≥ a} .
Therefore, if x ∈ BI , then qI(x) ≥ a and so fI(x) ≥ a, which finally implies f(x) ≥ a.
Therefore BI ⊆ A for all I.
In the reverse direction, suppose x ∈ A. Let I denote the set of indices i such that
fi(x) = σ(w
T
i x+bi) > 0. Then f(x) = fI(x). However, since each fi(x) > 0, by definition of
σ this implies that qi(x) > 0. Therefore, qI(x) = fI(x) = f(x) > a, and so x ∈ BI ⊆ B.
A.9 Linear Classifier Adversarial Directions Need Not Transfer to ReLUs
In this section, we explicitly construct a linearly separable dataset and a ReLU network that
correctly classifies the data but where the max-margin classifier does not transfer to the
ReLU.
Consider the training set S with three points (xi, yi) where
x1 = (−1, 1), y1 = 1
x2 = (1, 1), y2 = 1
x3 = (0,−1), y3 = −1.
It is straightforward to see that the max-margin classifier w∗, b∗ is given by w∗ = (0, 1),
b∗ = 0. Therefore, the adversarial direction specified by Theorem 4 is w∗ = (0, 1). However,
we could consider the following ReLU network:
f(x) = vTσ(Wx + b)
where
W =
(
1 1/4
−1 −1/4
)
, b =
(
1/2
−1/2
)
,v =
(
1
1
)
.
Here, σ denotes the coordinate-wise ReLU function. Our label function is given by
g(f(x)) where g(z) = −1 if z > 0 and 1 otherwise. It is clear to see that g(xi) = yi for all i.
Moreover, for all c > 0, g(x3 + cw∗) = −1. Therefore, w∗ is not an adversarial direction for
this ReLU network at (x3, y3).
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